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This paper evaluates and compares the safety performance of 
the various existing RLX warning systems. Traffic microsimula-
tion modeling was used to collect field data from the selected sites. 
The use of microsimulation with surrogate measures provides an 
enhanced way to conduct safety evaluation without risk. The use of 
traffic simulation for safety assessment usually confronts some dif-
ficulties, because traffic simulation assumes, based on car-following 
theory, that each vehicle has a gap in terms of distance. Some adjust-
ments have been implemented to overcome this issue. This study 
includes three indicators to evaluate safety: the potential number of 
conflicts, delay, and queue length. The paper is structured as follows. 
The section on past work critically reviews traffic conflict techniques 
in traffic microsimulation modeling; the section on the development 
of the simulation model provides a brief description of the procedure 
and results of the field data collection (as input for model develop-
ment in the next section); and the section on simulation results sets 
out the model development steps to present and compare the results. 
The final section concludes with the main findings.
Past Work
safety-related Issues
Accident data are traditionally gathered through police records. 
Safety assessments of traffic systems are usually analyzed on the 
basis of particular police-reported historical accident data. There-
fore, safety assessments are usually reactive. However, it is unrea-
sonable to wait for a large enough sample size (accidents) to occur 
before traffic systems can be evaluated, especially at RLXs, where 
police-reported historical records may not be sufficient for analysis 
either quantitatively or qualitatively (collisions at RLXs are rare but 
catastrophic). To address these constraints, traffic conflict techniques 
provide the possibility of modeling driver variation and proactive 
measurements.
The concept of traffic conflicts was first proposed by Perkins 
and Harris as an alternative to accident data, in relation to evasive 
maneuvers taken by drivers (9). In the early studies, an assumption 
that the conflicts must exist before crashes occurred was widely 
accepted to define the conflicts. However, in many cases, the accuracy 
of this assumption was doubtful (10, 11). At the First Workshop on 
Traffic Conflicts, an enhanced definition was suggested and agreed 
upon. Thereafter, the internationally accepted definition of a traffic 
conflict became (and remains) “an observable situation in which 
two or more road users approach each other in space and time to such 
an extent that there is a risk of collision if their movements remain 
unchanged” (12). This alternative definition has been adopted in a 
number of safety studies (13–17). Sayed and Zein developed predic-
tive models that use linear regression analysis to relate the number 
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Safety at railway level crossings (RLXs) is a worldwide issue that 
increasingly attracts the attention of relevant transport authorities, the 
rail industry, and the general public. The differences in the operation 
characteristics of varying types of warning devices, together with dif-
ferences in crossing geometry, traffic, or train characteristics, leads to 
different driver behaviors at crossings. The aim of this study was to use 
traffic microsimulation modeling based on field video recording data to 
compare the safety performance of varying conventional RLX warning 
systems. The widely used microsimulation model VISSIM was modi-
fied to produce safety-related performance measures, namely, colli-
sion likelihood, delay, and queue length. The results showed that RLXs 
with an active warning system were safer than those with a passive sign 
by at least 17%. Integration of surrogate measures in conjunction with 
traffic simulation models determined which safety approach was more 
efficient for specified traffic and train volumes.
Railway level crossings (RLXs) present serious potential conflicts 
between road vehicles and trains that can produce severe traffic 
outcomes. Safety at RLXs is a worldwide issue that increasingly 
attracts the attention of transport authorities, the rail industry, and 
the general public. More than 2,000 accidents occurred at active and 
passive railway crossings in the United States each year from 2006 
through 2010 (1). Each year, hundreds of people across Europe die 
in accidents at level crossings; these deaths account for one-third 
of all rail fatalities and 1% to 2% of all road deaths (2). In Australia 
(excluding New South Wales), 366 fatalities and 909 serious personal 
injuries resulted from 654 road vehicle collisions at RLXs between 
2001 and 2009 (3).
Like many countries, Australia has seen an improvement in terms 
of safety at RLXs as active or automated systems have replaced 
passive warning systems (4, 5). Studies show that driver behav-
ior responses are different at RLXs with different control devices 
(6, 7). Active or automated systems promote safer driver behavior. 
However, upgrading conventional active warning systems at RLXs 
is costly, especially in regional areas where train frequency and 
roadway traffic volumes are low. Furthermore, vehicle collisions 
at crossings are reported to be mainly attributed to driver behavior 
(i.e., noncompliance) in response to the warning device (8). Therefore, 
evaluating the safety of different types of warning systems at RLXs 
is of importance.
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of traffic conflicts to traffic volume and accidents (18). Sayed et al. 
related the traffic conflict technique to traffic microsimulation for 
safety assessment at unsignalized intersections (19). Archer regarded 
the traffic conflict technique as the most developed indirect measure 
of traffic safety (20).
Speed, as one of the fundamental characteristics of traffic flow, is 
commonly used to measure traffic performance on highway systems. 
It is also used as an indication of level of service in accident analy-
sis, and in economic studies (21). Anderson and Krammes, in their 
research analyzing the statistical relationship between mean acci-
dent rate and mean speed reduction, suggested that estimated speed 
reduction is a useful measure that helps explain how an accident 
experience at horizontal curves on rural two-lane highways varies with 
the degree of curvature (22). Noncompliance refers to nonadherence 
to the traffic rules or traffic control devices (i.e., running a red light, 
not stopping at a stop sign, etc.). A study by Abraham et al. tested 
the relationship between driver violations and RLX collisions (23). 
It revealed the potential of using violation data to determine the 
relative hazardousness of highway–rail crossings in combination 
with crash histories. The violation data may also be used to develop 
countermeasures that would help alleviate violations and eventually 
traffic collision problems at RLXs. Lee emphasized that delay was one 
of the prime indications for evaluating RLXs because the crossings 
might create excessive delays for road traffic and therefore possible 
violations (24). He concluded that a more detailed analysis had to be 
performed if the average delay exceeded a certain level.
application of traffic Microsimulation  
in Evaluation of safety Measures
Traffic microsimulation models play a pivotal role in assessing cur-
rent traffic conditions and then analyzing, assessing, and evaluating 
traffic problems. They allow alternative traffic operation systems to 
be tested in a simulated environment without physical interruption 
of existing traffic networks. This approach provides a platform for a 
performance comparison of varying solutions for decision making. 
It is a cost-effective approach for accessing implications of alternative 
traffic systems.
The use of traffic microsimulation for safety assessment usually 
encounters some difficulties because the microsimulation assumes 
that all road users drive their vehicles in a safe manner. Most of 
the commercially available microsimulation models are designed to 
evaluate traffic efficiency rather than traffic safety. Safety-related 
behavior assumptions in most of the traffic microsimulation models 
are tailored to represent rule-adherent drivers, which may not replicate 
real-world situations (e.g., speeding or red light running).
Therefore, traffic microsimulation models have a number of restric-
tions for traffic safety analyses. This limitation is mainly attributed to 
the high degree of variance in driver perception, reaction, and driving 
behavior and errors. These variations in human factors create potential 
conflicts such as incidents, near misses, and collisions. In addition, 
traffic microsimulation models are designed to avoid an occurrence 
of traffic collisions. In other words, all the driver–vehicle units in the 
traffic microsimulation will comply with traffic regulations (preset 
traffic microsimulation rules). However, this simulated situation does 
not exist in reality. For instance, not all motorists adhere to traffic 
control devices at RLXs (6).
As pointed out by Archer and Kosonen, the relatively strict deter-
ministic rule base that governs this type of simplified driver behav-
ior must be loosened to allow for a realistic amount of behavioral 
variance and a possibility for errors to occur (25). These limitations 
have been addressed by some researchers (14, 20, 26, 27). Gettman 
and Head evaluated important parameters in characteristics against 
commercially available traffic microsimulation models (28). All of 
the reviewed models required some level of modification, upgrade, 
or enhancement to support the derivation of surrogate safety measures. 
It does not appear possible to obtain surrogate measures from any of 
the reviewed traffic microsimulation models without some internal 
modifications to either the application programming interfaces or 
the source code modules themselves.
Despite the limitations, the traffic microsimulation approach 
is recommended for safety assessment because it has several 
advantages:
•	 It allows a hazardous circumstance to be explored safely. 
It is difficult to conduct field research on the likelihood of a crash, 
because such research may endanger lives or interrupt traffic 
operations.
•	 The output obtained should be reliable if calibration of the 
simulation is done logically.
•	 It enables users to evaluate a result with a relatively small 
amount of time and money.
•	 It enables users to evaluate a benefit before a safety system is 
implemented.
•	 Many different scenarios can be tested.
Several approaches to traffic safety issues in traffic microsimula-
tion have appeared in recent years. Although a significant number 
of studies have focused on road safety, none have involved RLXs 
(intersection collisions). Through the use of railway crossings as 
case studies, this paper attempts to apply a traffic conflict technique to 
traffic microsimulation. Three surrogate safety measures are adopted: 
compliance, delay, and queue length.
DEvEloPMEnt of sIMulatIon MoDEl
General approach
VISSIM was selected as a traffic microsimulation tool for this study. 
It is a widely used software package for microscopic multimodal 
traffic flow simulation that was developed in Germany. The general 
form of the car-following model is based on the psychophysical 
driver behavior model developed by Wiedemann and Reiter (29). The 
basic concept of this model is that a faster-driving vehicle reduces 
its speed to that of a slower-driving vehicle as a driver’s perception 
threshold is reached. The faster-driving vehicle decreases speed below 
the slower-driving vehicle until it can reaccelerate after the event. This 
iterative procedure remains until the simulation is finished (30).
In this study, a component object model interface developed in 
Visual Basic was integrated with VISSIM 5.3. VISSIM has been 
modified to produce safety measurements at RLXs with varying 
warning devices. Field data collected from three RLXs near Brisbane, 
Australia, were input to the model. The procedures of field data 
collection and the results are discussed in the next subsection. The 
outline of the model development is shown in Figure 1.
Model development involved two components: compliance 
(probability of stopping) and speed profile. The probability of stop-
ping in this study was defined as the rate of driver compliance with 
the warning devices at RLXs. This component indicates whether or 
not drivers proceed across crossings when warnings are activated. 
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In VISSIM, this is a part of the signal control function under the 
driving-behavior parameter sets. Speed profiles that were collected 
from the field data were used. These two analyzed components were 
the main factors that contributed to the development of the simulation 
model. A detailed explanation about these components is given in 
the following paragraphs.
field Data Collection
Data were collected with a portable traffic surveillance camera. The 
selected study sites were carefully investigated so that the installed 
camera would be hidden from the view of the drivers, because their 
knowledge of the device could affect their driving behavior. The cam-
era was erected near the crossing area to capture the operation of the 
warning devices as well as a roadway section of more than 200 m from 
the stop line. Once the recording process started, distance was mea-
sured. Steel plates painted in white were placed at 20-m intervals from 
the stop line (referred to as 0 m) to 200 m on both sides of the road.
Video footage was captured under normal daylight conditions 
from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. at 25 video frames per second. Data were 
collected for all vehicle types, including passenger vehicles, trucks, and 
buses. From field observation during site selection trips, an approach-
ing distance of 200 m was determined to be sufficient for drivers of all 
vehicle types to react appropriately to the warning devices. Because 
the major traffic composition at all three study sites was mainly 
passenger vehicles, data were not grouped into vehicle types.
The primary data retrieved were stopping compliance (violation) 
and approaching speed profile (7). The results summarized in Table 1 
were input to the modified VISSIM model; Site 1 has a stop sign, 
Site 2 has flashing lights only, and Site 3 has a boom barrier with 
flashing lights. The data input included the stopping-compliance rate, 
the average speed recorded at the last two intervals (0 to 20 m and 
20 to 40 m) of road section approaching an RLX, and the standard 
deviation of the averaged speed.
Driver stopping compliance is defined as total adherence to traffic 
rules. For instance, crossings with stop signs require a motorist to 
stop completely to look for the presence of a train in both directions. 
Similarly, motorists should stop when an active control system is 
activated by an approaching train. For Site 1, vehicles that did stop 
in front of the stop line were regarded as compliant; other move-
ments such as slowing down and driving through were categorized 
as noncompliant. For Sites 2 and 3, stopping compliance was mea-
sured as soon as the warning devices were activated. The two reac-
tions were categorized as stopped (compliance) or drove through 
(noncompliance). The observations show that the compliance rate 
at the passive crossing with stop sign (Site 1) was 41%, which is 
considerably lower than that at the two active crossings (70% at Site 2; 
77% at Site 3). The compliance rate at Site 3 was slightly higher 
than that at Site 2. Similar results have been reported by various 
studies (31–33), although Abraham et al. found that drivers tended 
to commit more violations at the gated level crossings than they did 
at those that had only flashing lights (23). These differences exist as 
a result of different localized site conditions, driver behavior, and 
environmental conditions.
Probability of stopping (Driver Compliance)
At a crossing equipped with flashing lights only or with boom 
barrier with flashing lights, drivers tended to drive as if they were 
driving through a road intersection with an amber (yellow) signal. 
Although some drivers were willing to comply with flashing lights 
or boom gates, others were not patient enough to wait until a train 
passed the RLX. Because drivers make a decision either to go or stop, 
a probability model in VISSIM was used to replicate the stopping-
compliance rate, as shown in Table 1. The probability model, p, is 
given by Equations 1 and 2:
p
ui= + −
1
1
1
exp
( )
ui v= + +α β β1 2 2dx ( )
where
 v = speed,
 dx = distance, and
	α, β1, and β2 = constants.
In VISSIM, speed and distance are variables used as a function 
of the probability of stopping at road intersections. In the study 
reported here, speed and distance were ignored (β1, β2 = 0) and α 
was replaced with the actual compliance rate from the field results 
because a major factor in this study is how warning systems them-
selves affect driving behavior. As the compliance rate of the RLX 
Field Data
from Sites
Compliance
(Probability of Stopping) Speed Profile
Safety Traffic
Simulation Model
Potential Conflicts &
Performance Measurements
FIGURE 1  Outline of model development procedure.
TABLE 1  Field Results for VISSIM Model Development
Input Datum Site 3 Site 2 Site 1
Compliance rate (%) 77 70 41
Average speed (km/h)
  0–20 m 24.7 27.2 16.3
  20–40 m 34.5 33.8 38.4
Standard deviation (km/h)
  0–20 m 18.9 19.9  6.4
  20–40 m 16.2 11.3  9.6
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with flashing lights, boom barrier with flashing lights, and stop signs 
is 70%, 77%, and 41%, α becomes 0.8, 1.1, and −0.4, respectively.
safety simulation Model
The signal control function in VISSIM has been modified to sim-
ulate a violation, which allows output of numbers of likelihood of 
collision. The developed simulation model contains train tracks, 
roads, types of vehicles, detectors, and signal controls as shown in 
Figure 2. Train tracks run east and west in both directions; roads 
intersect these train tracks in a vertical direction. In this study, the 
simulation model was designed for an area where trains run relatively 
less frequently (a suburban area at off-peak times). Trains arrived 
every 30 min and vehicles were introduced to the network at 450 
and 900 vehicles per hour (vph), respectively. The simulation ran 
for 5 h (18,000 s) with intervals of 0.1 s. Three detectors played a role 
in triggering a virtual signal control so that warning devices were 
activated accordingly.
With these data as input for a traffic microsimulation model, an 
example network was developed to identify how many collisions 
were likely to take place at the RLX equipped with a stop sign, 
flashing lights, or boom barrier with flashing lights. The developed 
model assumed the following:
•	 A signal head function in VISSIM was adopted as stop line at 
the RLX.
•	 Vehicles moved in each direction and were simulated every 
second.
•	 Trains ran in each direction based on headway.
•	 The proportion of heavy goods vehicles was 10%.
•	 To reduce the theoretical deviations, the Monte Carlo method 
was applied.
Fifteen different random seeds were repeated to decrease uncertainty.
The following procedure is shown in Figure 2:
•	 When a train touched Detector 1, the signal head turned amber. 
In reality, RLX warnings are activated to approaching vehicles. 
Detector 1 was placed at the location where the warning was acti-
vated approximately 30 s before the train arrived at the crossing area; 
this procedure is in accordance with the Association of American 
Railroads manual, which is followed by the Australian Rail Track 
Corporation (34).
•	 Vehicles then followed the rule of the probability of stopping, 
which is derived from the compliance rate.
•	 If the vehicles proceeded to touch the area called likelihood 
of collision, then the simulation stored the vehicle identifier, speed, 
and vehicle type.
•	 When the train touched Detector 2, the vehicles completely 
stopped in front of the signal head. Detector 2 was placed at the 
location where, for the situations with the stop sign and the flashing 
lights, drivers could clearly see the train approaching but the boom 
barrier with flashing lights prohibited vehicles once they were fully 
closed.
•	 When the train touched Detector 3, the signal head turned green, 
allowing vehicles access to the RLX. Detector 3 was placed at the 
location where warning was deactivated.
sIMulatIon rEsults
When the RLX warning was activated by the train at Detector 1, 
detailed outputs from the VISSIM simulation, such as vehicle coding 
and the vehicle’s speed, updating position, and acceleration, were 
extracted from the likelihood of collision on second-by-second and 
a vehicle-by-vehicle basis. Because there is a high possibility of a 
conflict at that point, vehicles involved in the likelihood-of-collision 
instances were recorded as potential conflicts.
Virtual Signal
Head
Likelihood of
Collisions
Direction of Train
Direction of Vehicles
Dilemma Zone
Probability of Stop
= f(distance, speed, α)
FIGURE 2  Layout of model in VISSIM.
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likelihood of Collision
The number of likely conflicts was compared at Sites 1 (stop sign), 
2 (flashing lights), and 3 (boom barrier with flashing lights). Table 2 
summarizes the results based on the number of trains and vehicles at 
the three RLXs. When the traffic flow was 450 vph in each direction 
and the train ran every 30 min, 14 potential conflicts were recorded 
at Site 2; in contrast, 12 potential conflicts were found at Site 3. In 
relative terms, there were 17% fewer potential conflicts at the cross-
ing with a boom barrier with flashing lights than at the crossing with 
flashing lights only. When the traffic flow was increased to 900 vph 
in each direction, the potential conflicts recorded at Site 2 increased 
to 16, but the potential conflicts remained at 12 at Site 3. The results 
also show that Site 3 and Site 2 were safer than Site 1 by 300% and 
350% to 400%, respectively.
As expected, the crossing equipped with the boom barrier with 
flashing lights (Site 3) had the least number of potential conflicts. 
When compared with the crossing with flashing lights only (Site 2), 
the difference was very small, but the crossing with the flashing lights 
had a high potential for conflicts. A comparison between different 
traffic volumes did not show significant relationships between warn-
ing systems. This is mainly because potential conflicts would occur 
for the first car approaching. If the first car stopped, then the cars 
following it had to stop behind it.
Delay and Queue length
Delay and queue length are appropriate measures not only of traf-
fic efficiency but also of traffic safety. Here, the definition of delay 
is the time a vehicle is stopped or its speed is reduced below a cer-
tain speed (e.g., 2 km/h) and does not exceed a certain speed (e.g., 
5 km/h). When some drivers experience delays to some extent near 
railway crossings, they tend to change their driving behavior. They 
may cross the crossing illegally, make a U-turn to find an alterna-
tive route, or lose attention to proximity. Under such conditions, 
unsafe practices may result. As shown in Table 3, Sites 2 (flashing 
lights only) and 3 (boom barrier with flashing lights) show similar 
results on all measures. A comparison between Site 3 and Site 1 at 
450 vph in each direction shows that Site 3 has 9% less total delay, 
TABLE 2  Number of Potential Conflicts
Traffic Flow of 450 vph  
(each direction)
Traffic Flow of 900 vph  
(each direction)
Seed Site 3 Site 2 Site 1 Site 3 Site 2 Site 1
Run 1 10 13 37  7 13 74
Run 2 16 12 36 13 20 58
Run 3 19 21 33 11 14 38
Run 4 16 24 40 10 15 46
Run 5 15 20 41 12 17 55
Run 6 10 12 45 17 21 63
Run 7 12 15 59 13 17 55
Run 8 15 16 47 10 12 50
Run 9  9  9 39 17 18 48
Run 10 13 17 44 15 23 54
Run 11 11 18 55  9 13 43
Run 12  6 11 43  8 12 37
Run 13  6  7 30  9 10 32
Run 14  9 12 39 13 13 35
Run 15  6 10 42 14 15 34
Number of potential 
conflicts
12 14 42 12 16 48 
TABLE 3  Output for Delay and Queue Length
Traffic Flow of 450 vph  
(each direction)
Traffic Flow of 900 vph  
(each direction)
Variable Site 3 Site 2 Site 1 Site 3 Site 2 Site 1
Total delay (h) 8.2 8.1 8.9 47.2 47.0 57.0
Total stopped delay (h) 1.2 1.2 0.8 4.0 3.9 3.1
Average queue length (m) 7.9 7.7 5.6 40.8 40.3 31.6
Number of stops 222 218 168 707 701 595
Total vehicles for 5 h 4,525 4,525 4,529 9,005 9,005 9,010
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33% more total stopped delay, 29% more queue length, and 24% 
more vehicle stops than does Site 1. This result means that although 
stop signs lead to more delay, the flashing lights and the boom barrier 
with flashing lights caused more stopped delay, longer queue length, 
and more stops.
One of the advantages of using traffic microsimulation is that the 
results can be used to identify traffic phenomena for each specific 
time interval. This helps researchers focus on critical indicators. In 
this study, a time interval was set for every 30 min over 5 h. Figure 3a 
shows that the average queue length for Sites 2 and 3 was identical 
for every time interval of 450 vph in each direction. Figure 3b shows 
the average total delay that each vehicle experienced every 30 min. 
Each vehicle that neared the boom barrier with flashing lights and 
the flashing lights only experienced a delay from 33 to 40 s, but 
the delay was from 36 to 45 s at the stop sign. Figure 3c shows the 
way in which the number of stops changed over the 30-min period. 
Comparable results were obtained when the traffic flow was increased 
to 900 vph.
FIGURE 3  Results of 450-vph testing in each direction: (a) average queue length and (b) average total delay per vehicle.
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ConClusIons
Much research has been conducted on safety at road intersections. 
This paper shows that with the integration of surrogate safety mea-
sures and commercially available traffic simulation software, micro-
simulation can be used to evaluate RLXs with different types of 
warning devices. By incorporating actual field violation data in the 
model, the number of likely collisions for different warning devices 
was estimated. This microsimulation tool will assist in determin-
ing which safety approach is most efficient for specified traffic and 
train volumes. This application can be extended to assess issues 
of traffic queue backup over crossing from an adjacent intersection 
located downstream, and varying countermeasures can be evaluated. 
By integration with a driving simulator, this approach can be applied 
to evaluate and compare the safety performance of alternative warning 
devices such as rumble strips and in-vehicle audio warnings.
Some limitations have to be overcome in further research for a 
better understanding of railway safety. Occurrences of vehicle and 
train conflicts at RLXs are low compared with road intersection 
conflicts, so there is not enough data from which to draw definite 
conclusions. The characteristics of RLX and road intersections are 
different in terms of traffic volume, posted speed, and environmental 
setting. Another shortcoming of the study reported here is that the 
speed profiles were obtained from only three sites, and therefore 
cannot be generalized across other environments. Although other 
vehicle types such as trucks may possibly exhibit different vehicle 
and driver characteristics, traffic compositions other than passenger 
cars in the field were not considered in view of the nonsignificant 
volume. In general, it is thought that further refinements of the 
method are worthwhile. For improved calibration purposes, other 
VISSIM input parameters such as perception–reaction time, car-
following characteristics, and deceleration distribution should be 
investigated in the field. Nevertheless, the following conclusions 
can be drawn from this study:
•	 Traffic microsimulation can be used with some modifications 
to evaluate RLX safety.
•	 The difference found in terms of a number of potential conflicts 
at RLXs with boom barriers with flashing lights and those with flash-
ing lights only is relatively small, because main inputs such as speed 
and compliance rates measured in the field are similar for these two 
warning devices.
•	 The number of potential conflicts at stop signs is significantly 
higher than it is for other warning systems.
•	 Although delay at stop signs is higher than it is for other treat-
ments, the total stopped delay is lower. This phenomenon implies 
that drivers tend to slow down but not completely stop near RLXs 
equipped with stop signs.
•	 As the stopped delay is low, the queue length is also shorter 
at stop signs.
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